The agreement’s impact will vary widely across EU regions and sectors, often splitting along North–South and center–periphery lines:

• Germany & Industrialized North: Germany exemplifies the Northern industrial export powerhouse that wins under Mercosur. German firms (autos, machinery, chemicals) gain improved access to Mercosur’s high-tariff markets (e.g. Brazil’s 35% car tariff) (European Parliament (DG EXPO) study, 2025). By 2040, Germany is projected to have a slight GDP uptick (~+0.05%) from the deal (OeNB Bulletin Q4/25, 2025). German cars, machine tools, and pharma are expected to see billions in tariff savings (EU exporters collectively save ~€4 billion in duties yearly under the deal) (TRT World/AFP — “EU countries override France…”, Dec 2025). Employment in German manufacturing could expand modestly (the SIA showed +0.11% manufacturing jobs EU-wide) (Sustainability Impact Assessment (LSE), 2020). Agriculturally, Germany is less exposed – it’s a net beef exporter and has competitive pork/poultry sectors. Still, German farmers worry about cheap imports undermining sectors like poultry or honey (Brazil is a big honey exporter). But overall, Germany strongly supports the pact, emphasizing geopolitical and supply-chain benefits. Chancellor Merz hailed it as a “milestone…signal of our strategic sovereignty” (TRT World/AFP — “EU countries override France…”, Dec 2025). This pro-trade stance reflects Germany’s winners (export industries, consumers) outweighing losers. Germany also counts on critical raw materials access (Mercosur minerals, etc.) to diversify away from China (TRT World/AFP — “EU countries override France…”, Dec 2025) – a strategic motive beyond GDP.

• France: France is positioned as the prime loser/critic in the EU. With its large farming sector (beef, poultry, sugar, cereals) and a strong political voice for farmers, France has vehemently opposed the deal “as it stands” (Austrian Chamber of Labour (AK Wien), 2021). French beef and sugar producers are explicitly identified as vulnerable – EU beef output could drop ~1–1.2%, largely concentrated in France and Ireland (Austrian Chamber of Labour (AK Wien), 2021). French officials fear “a flow of cheaper [agri] goods” undercutting domestic farmers (TRT World/AFP — “EU countries override France…”, Dec 2025). Indeed, Mercosur’s competitive advantage in beef, poultry, sugar, ethanol directly challenges French producers. The political backlash is strong: the French Parliament unanimously rejected the deal, and President Macron declared it a “deal from another era” that France will vote against (TRT World/AFP — Macron statement, Jan 8 2026). He pointed to unfair competition for farmers and insufficient guarantees on environment and standards (TRT World/AFP — Macron statement, Jan 8 2026). France did negotiate concessions – an “emergency brake” safeguard on farm imports and some reciprocity on production standards (e.g. pesticides) (TRT World/AFP — Macron statement, Jan 8 2026) – but remains unconvinced. Distributionally, France does have potential winners: its famous wine & spirits industry gains from Mercosur tariff elimination (up to 27% duties removed) (European Commission factsheet for farmers, Sep 2025), and French cars/industries would also benefit somewhat. However, these gains are diffuse, while the losers (beef farmers, sugar beet growers, poultry producers) are concentrated and politically mobilized. France’s stance illustrates a value-based and distributional conflict: marginal GDP gains and export opportunities are, in its view, outweighed by threats to rural livelihoods and environmental values. In summary, France expects more displacement than growth, especially in its rural heartlands, making it the leading internal opponent of the pact.

• Spain & Portugal: Southern Europe has a nuanced position. Spain and Portugal have mixed interests – a foot in both agricultural and industrial camps. Spain is poised to gain via its industrial base and globalized agri-food firms: Spanish car manufacturers (e.g. SEAT) and machinery exporters will gain from Mercosur tariff cuts, and Spanish wine, olive oil, and dairy will get better access (e.g. EU cheese quota of 30,000 t for Mercosur) (European Commission factsheet for farmers, Sep 2025). Spain’s extra-EU export share to Mercosur is relatively high (~5% of its global exports) (European Parliament (DG EXPO) study, 2025), indicating offensive interests. At the same time, Spain’s farmers could face competition in beef, citrus, rice, and sugar. Notably, cheap Mercosur beef and poultry challenge Spain’s domestic meat sector (Spain has a significant beef feedlot industry). Mercosur is also a world player in rice and citrus – products grown in Spain’s south. Spanish rice growers (e.g. in Andalusia) fear imports, as EU rice tariffs will be partly liberalized; France explicitly cited rice among concerns (TRT World/AFP — “EU countries override France…”, Dec 2025) (Uruguay is a rice exporter). However, internal analysis suggests these impacts are moderate: e.g. Spanish beef farmers might see prices soften, but not collapse (thanks to TRQs). The Spanish government, balancing these factors, has generally supported the deal (Spain joined Germany in favor), emphasizing the export upside for “hampered industries” and the opportunity to strengthen ties with Latin America (TRT World/AFP — “EU countries override France…”, Dec 2025). Portugal, meanwhile, actually has the highest Mercosur import exposure in the EU (nearly 15% of Portugal’s extra-EU imports come from Mercosur) (European Parliament (DG EXPO) study, 2025) – mostly due to soy for feed, beef, coffee, and other commodities from Brazil. This high dependence means Portuguese consumers and feed buyers have benefitted from Mercosur supplies, but domestic producers (e.g. Portuguese cattle farmers, dairy) are vulnerable if those imports grow. Portugal’s export gains from the deal are relatively modest (only ~1% of its extra-EU exports go to Mercosur) (European Parliament (DG EXPO) study, 2025), but its economy could indirectly gain from any boost to Spanish industry or via port logistics (e.g. Porto, Sines ports). Politically, Portugal has been supportive of Mercosur integration (reflecting historical Brazil ties), but is keenly aware of the need for modernization support for its farmers. In sum, Spain and Portugal stand to gain in export sectors (cars, machinery, food exports like olive oil/wine) while feeling pressure on certain farm sectors. Within these countries, winners will be industrial regions (e.g. Spain’s Catalonia and Basque Country for manufacturing, Rioja for wine exports) and losers likely in more rural, less competitive farming areas (e.g. beef farmers in Spain’s grassland regions, rice farmers around the Guadalquivir, or smallholders in Portugal’s Alentejo).

• Denmark: Denmark illustrates the case of a highly efficient agricultural exporter that is cautiously optimistic about Mercosur. Danish industry (pharma, machinery, wind turbines) welcomes new markets, and Danish consumers might enjoy cheaper South American produce. Agriculture in Denmark is dual-edged: On one hand, Danish agribusiness (especially pork and dairy) is globally competitive and could expand exports of cheese or enzymes to Mercosur. On the other hand, Denmark imports substantial soy and feed from Mercosur – nearly 4% of its extra-EU imports are from Mercosur, primarily soybeans for its intensive pig farms (European Parliament (DG EXPO) study, 2025). Access to cheaper feed inputs is a benefit that could improve margins for Danish farmers. The main competitive concern for Denmark is beef and possibly poultry: Denmark’s beef sector is small, but any EU-wide price dip in meat can affect it. Danish poultry producers might worry about Brazil’s huge poultry industry (though EU quotas limit Brazilian poultry to a fraction of EU consumption) (European Commission factsheet for farmers, Sep 2025). Overall, Denmark tends to favor free trade (being export-oriented), and the government has supported the deal with emphasis on sustainability enforcement. Danish stakeholders often highlight the need for level playing field standards – e.g. ensuring Mercosur adheres to veterinary and environmental rules (no hormones, etc.) so that Danish producers are not unfairly disadvantaged (Thünen Institute update, 2025). In distributional terms, Denmark’s winners include its food processing industry (which might source cheaper inputs) and high-tech exporters; losers could be any farmers facing price competition, though Denmark’s efficient farms and the deal’s safeguards mean impacts are likely minimal (projected output changes ~±1% at most). Indeed, one analysis foresees no Danish sector contracting more than 1.5% (Thünen Institute update, 2025).

• Greece: Greece and similar Southern/Eastern periphery members (with relatively small industrial bases and fragmented agriculture) are likely net losers, or at best marginal participants, in the Mercosur deal. Greece trades little with Mercosur – only ~0.3% of Greek extra-EU exports go to Mercosur, while about 1.6% of its extra-EU imports come from Mercosur (primarily commodities like soy, beef, and tobacco) (European Parliament (DG EXPO) study, 2025). That means Greek exporters gain almost nothing (few new markets), but Greek markets could see import competition in products like beef and possibly citrus or juices (Brazil is a major orange juice exporter, overlapping with Greek oranges). The bigger issue for Greece is its lack of agricultural readiness (see Deliverable B) – Greek agriculture is high-cost and dependent on EU subsidies, thus highly vulnerable to any price downturn. For example, cheaper Mercosur beef or poultry, even in small volumes, could further squeeze Greece’s small livestock farmers. Greece’s enduring problems in CAP fund management (including a recent €392 million fine for subsidy mismanagement) highlight structural weaknesses (To Vima — CAP subsidy mismanagement fine, Jun 2025). These weaknesses limit Greek farmers’ ability to adapt and compete. Regionally, rural Greece (e.g. cattle farmers in Macedonia, smallholders in Thessaly) could face income hits, whereas urban consumers benefit slightly from cheaper imports. The Greek government has echoed France’s concerns and has been among those demanding stronger safeguards. In October 2023, Greece aligned with France, Ireland, and others to delay Mercosur ratification over agriculture and climate worries (TRT World/AFP — “EU countries override France…”, Dec 2025). Bottom line: Greece sees little upside and significant downside risk – a classic case of a distributional loser in a trade deal. This pattern may extend to other Balkan EU members (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia), which similarly have small export stakes in Mercosur but large populations of small farmers reliant on EU market prices. These countries are deeply concerned that even a small increase in Mercosur imports (meat, sugar, etc.) could depress EU farm-gate prices and “hollow out” their rural economies.

• Belgium: Belgium encapsulates the internal division the deal causes in parts of Europe. On one side, Belgium’s cosmopolitan, trade-oriented economy (especially Flanders and the port of Antwerp) stands to gain from increased EU-Mercosur trade volumes. Belgian chemical and pharmaceutical industries could expand exports, and as a major logistics hub, Belgium would handle more imports (for instance, more Latin American goods entering via Antwerp). On the other side, Belgian farmers (especially in Wallonia) are vocal opponents of Mercosur. Wallonia has a significant beef cattle sector and already struggled with low prices; an influx of Mercosur beef (even quota-limited) is seen as an existential threat. Belgian dairy farmers similarly worry about competition from Mercosur milk powders or cheeses (though the deal actually favors EU dairy exports). These fears have translated into street protests: young farmers in Belgium blocked highways with tractors in late 2025, decrying the deal as sacrificing EU farming for German cars (TRT World/AFP — “EU countries override France…”, Dec 2025). Politically, Belgium initially hesitated on Mercosur; the Walloon regional parliament famously threatened to veto CETA in 2016, and Mercosur triggers similar sensitivities. Ultimately, in the December 2025 compromise, Belgium agreed to proceed, but only alongside promises of a robust farm safeguard mechanism and EU aid. Thus, in Belgium the winners are abstract (logistics firms, exporters, consumers), while the losers are tangible (family farmers). This has made Belgium a hotbed of debate about trade justice and credible enforcement of environmental and sanitary standards. Expect Belgian policymakers to push hard for the €6.3 billion European farm “crisis fund” and strict monitoring of import surges to placate domestic constituencies (TRT World/AFP — “EU countries override France…”, Dec 2025).

• Balkans (Southeastern EU): EU members in the Balkan region (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria, as well as candidate countries in the Western Balkans) have agricultural profiles that could be strained by Mercosur competition. Romania and Bulgaria, for instance, are significant producers of cereals, sunflower oil, and livestock. While Mercosur is not a direct competitor in wheat or sunflower, it is a powerhouse in maize, poultry, and beef – meaning EU markets for those products could see price pressure. Romanian farmers, already contending with global competition, could see, say, more Brazilian beef pushing down prices or Argentine maize influencing feed markets. Additionally, these countries have structural issues: many small subsistence farms, lower productivity, and instances of misallocation of EU funds (for example, OLAF has uncovered fraud in rural development projects in Romania’s Danube delta) (OLAF — Danube Delta rural development fraud case, Jan 2025). Such issues mean agricultural resilience is low – farmers are less equipped to compete or adjust. The Western Balkans (Serbia, etc.), while not in the EU, also worry about knock-on effects if EU markets saturate with Mercosur imports (since they export some agri-food to the EU). That said, since Balkan member states do not export much to Mercosur (negligible Mercosur trade share) (European Parliament (DG EXPO) study, 2025), they have little to gain from new market access. In EU Council negotiations, countries like Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania often sided with France in skepticism of the deal’s benefits, and Poland, for example, voted no due to beef and poultry farmers’ concerns (TRT World/AFP — “EU countries override France…”, Dec 2025). For the Balkan EU members, distributional pressure points include rural employment (agriculture remains a big employer there) and food self-sufficiency worries (see Deliverable C). To avoid being pure losers, these countries will seek EU compensation and strong enforcement of standards to ensure fair competition. Absent that, Mercosur could exacerbate regional disparities, with richer EU countries capitalizing on industrial exports while poorer rural regions in the Balkans bear the adjustment costs.

Many southern EU regions fall short on several readiness metrics, despite years of EU investment.

• Productivity varies widely: Northern Italy or northeast Spain are highly productive, but parts of Greece, Portugal, and the Balkan EU states have yields well below the EU average.
• Mechanization is uneven: For example, Greece’s farm machinery fleet is aging and smaller on average, and digital farming uptake is low (few Greek farms use precision ag).
• Logistics and co-ops: Some areas, like Emilia-Romagna in Italy or Catalonia in Spain, boast strong cooperatives and food industries, whereas in Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, many farmers operate in fragmented structures with weaker co-op movements.

These gaps contribute to inefficient marketing and higher costs. Crucially, implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in these regions has exposed serious shortcomings. The European Court of Auditors (ECA) and OLAF have documented numerous investment failures and misallocations of CAP funds:

• In Greece, systemic mismanagement of agricultural subsidies was exposed recently. From 2016–2023, Greece made subsidy payments with “persistent deficiencies” in checks, leading to €392 million of EU funds deemed ineligible (To Vima — CAP subsidy mismanagement fine, Jun 2025). Ghost farmers and inflated land claims (e.g. the “pastureland” scandal) siphoned off money meant for modernization (Steppo EU Law Blog — Greek CAP fraud & EPPO investigations, Mar 2025). Despite warnings, the Greek paying agency (OPEKEPE) failed to implement controls, resulting in what the Commission described as “chronic and structural” issues (To Vima — CAP subsidy mismanagement fine, Jun 2025). Essentially, funds that could have improved competitiveness were lost to fraud and patronage. This highlights a readiness problem: rules exist on paper, but enforcement and effective use of funds lag badly.
• It’s not just Greece: multiple countries have struggled. Italy uncovered even greater CAP fraud volumes – ~€4.65 billion in damages under investigation in 2024 (ten times Greece’s, with stronger prosecution capacity) (Steppo EU Law Blog — Greek CAP fraud & comparative figures, Mar 2025). Romania saw a major OLAF case where rural development funds in the Danube Delta were embezzled, reflecting weak local governance (OLAF — Danube Delta rural development fraud case, Jan 2025). Portugal, while generally better, has also been flagged for a high volume of CAP infractions in some reporting, underscoring that misallocations are not isolated (To Vima — CAP subsidy mismanagement fine, Jun 2025). These examples reveal a pattern: billions intended for farm modernization often fail to reach the right projects. The ECA’s reporting on CAP anti-fraud has stressed fragmented efforts and the need for stronger oversight and control systems (European Court of Auditors — Special Report on CAP fraud response; Systematic literature review on CAP socioeconomic impacts).
• CAP implementation gaps: A recurring theme is limited national administration capacity in parts of Southern/Eastern Europe. From incomplete land registries and weak data systems (including delays and gaps that enabled false claims in Greece) to insufficient on-the-ground inspections, these weaknesses mean that even when money is allocated for equipment, training, or green farming, results can be muted (TRT World — analysis of Greek subsidy scandal, 2025). EU rural development funds have financed tractors, irrigation systems, and other investments, but if projects are selected through cronyism or are not monitored, competitiveness gains remain partial. Mechanization can improve “on paper” without translating into durable productivity increases when funds are misused or maintenance and skills are lacking.

The net effect is that Southern European and Balkan agriculture remains partially “unready” for a competitive shock. Many farms rely on direct payments to stay solvent; if market prices drop due to Mercosur imports, these farms have limited buffer and weak adaptability.

Overall axis score is the median of the three sub-factor ratings (so one outlier does not dominate).

GermanyAxis 1 — Readiness to absorb competition

1) Production efficiency & structure: High.
Evidence: Germany’s farm structure includes large-scale holdings in the East (average ~186 ha) and mid-scale in the West (average ~55 ha), which supports mechanisation and cost resilience. (Agriculture and rural development)

2) Value-chain coordination: Medium–High.
Evidence: Germany has major farmer-owned processing capacity in dairy via cooperative groups (e.g., DMK), and the Arla–DMK tie-up is explicitly framed as scaling cooperative processing and market reach. (Reuters)

3) Execution capacity: Medium–High.
Evidence: Germany’s CAP payment/control infrastructure relies on integrated farm-level administrative systems (IACS) that enable systematic monitoring and enforcement, and that data infrastructure is widely used in applied research because it is operational at scale. (Agriculture and rural development)

Axis 1 overall: High.

Axis 2 — Concentrated exposure in the sensitive basket

1) Sensitive-sector footprint: Low.
Evidence: The deal’s politically sensitive import risks concentrate on beef, poultry, sugar at EU level, and Germany is not one of the frontline political opponents framed around those sectors in current reporting, while supporters emphasise industrial/export upside. (Reuters)

2) Buffer thinness where it lands: Low–Medium.
Evidence: The same farm structure evidence points to meaningful scale buffers in large parts of German agriculture. (Agriculture and rural development)

3) Mobilisation intensity: Low.
Evidence: Germany is cited as a key supporter, with leadership presenting the deal as a milestone, and it is not described as a protest/veto hotspot in current reporting. (Reuters)

Axis 2 overall: Low.

Final placement: High readiness / Low exposure.

FranceAxis 1 — Readiness to absorb competition

1) Production efficiency & structure: Medium–High.
Evidence: France has large-scale farming on average (~53 ha) and a large professional farming base (~390k farmers), which supports scale and throughput. (Agriculture and rural development)

2) Value-chain coordination: High.
Evidence: French agricultural cooperatives are reported to process ~40% of French agricultural production, which signals strong downstream coordination and bargaining capacity. (ESSEC Knowledge)

3) Execution capacity: Medium.
Evidence: CAP fraud/control performance hinges on national control systems, and EU auditors explicitly treat enforcement quality as a binding variable across member states, with detection and follow-up uneven. (European Court of Auditors)

Axis 1 overall: Medium–High.

Axis 2 — Concentrated exposure in the sensitive basket

1) Sensitive-sector footprint: High.
Evidence: France is a major producer in sensitive categories, including beef/veal within EU production shares and sugar beet among top EU producers, which concentrates perceived exposure to quota-based import pressure. (CEFS)

2) Buffer thinness where it lands: Medium.
Evidence: Exposure concentrates in identifiable rural production systems, and the political salience reflects perceived livelihood risk in those places. (Reuters)

3) Mobilisation intensity: High.
Evidence: Macron is reported calling the agreement “from another era” and stating France will vote against, and France is consistently named among the core opponents. (Reuters)

Axis 2 overall: High.

Final placement: Medium–High readiness / High exposure.

SpainAxis 1 — Readiness to absorb competition

1) Production efficiency & structure: Medium.
Evidence: Spain has deep fragmentation in parts of its farm base, with around half of farms at 5 ha or less, and farm census analysis highlights a large share of low-output small holdings. (Agriculture and rural development)

2) Value-chain coordination: Medium–High.
Evidence: Spain’s cooperative system is large and formalised, with a national organisation representing 3,600+ cooperatives, ~€38bn turnover, and ~1 million members, which supports marketing, processing, and bargaining. (Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias)

3) Execution capacity: Medium.
Evidence: CAP outcomes depend on national administrative controls, and the EU audit view treats implementation quality as decisive for whether funds translate into modernisation. (European Court of Auditors)

Axis 1 overall: Medium.

Axis 2 — Concentrated exposure in the sensitive basket

1) Sensitive-sector footprint: Medium.
Evidence: Spain’s sensitive exposure is meaningful in specific products and regions, with rice production heavily concentrated (Guadalquivir marshes produce over half of Spanish rice in the cited analysis), which creates place-based risk even if national aggregates dilute it. (MDPI)

2) Buffer thinness where it lands: Medium.
Evidence: Fragmented holdings raise thin-margin sensitivity in affected regions. (Agriculture and rural development)

3) Mobilisation intensity: Low–Medium.
Evidence: Spain is repeatedly listed among supporters, and current reporting frames opposition around France/Poland/Hungary more than Spain. (Reuters)

Axis 2 overall: Medium.

Final placement: Medium readiness / Medium exposure.

PortugalAxis 1 — Readiness to absorb competition

1) Production efficiency & structure: Low–Medium.
Evidence: Portugal’s farm base is highly fragmented, with ~67% of farms under 5 ha and ~46% under 2 ha, and the same official summary notes an aging and low-skilled demographic profile, which constrains mechanisation and upgrading pace. (Agriculture and rural development)

2) Value-chain coordination: Medium–Low.
Evidence: The official profile shows a small primary sector share of the economy alongside very fragmented farm structure, which typically weakens bargaining power unless counterweighted by strong co-op/processing, and that counterweight is not evidenced in the same profile. (Agriculture and rural development)

3) Execution capacity: Medium.
Evidence: EU auditors flag that CAP effectiveness depends on national control capacity and follow-through, and this is a known differentiator across member states. (European Court of Auditors)

Axis 1 overall: Medium–Low.

Axis 2 — Concentrated exposure in the sensitive basket

1) Sensitive-sector footprint: Medium.
Evidence: The Portugal profile frames a large, place-embedded small-farm base, which raises sensitivity to any category where imports pressure farmgate prices, even if the exact mix (beef/poultry/rice/sugar) varies by region. (Agriculture and rural development)

2) Buffer thinness where it lands: High.
Evidence: Fragmentation plus aging and low skills are direct thin-buffer signals. (Agriculture and rural development)

3) Mobilisation intensity: Low–Medium.
Evidence: Portugal is not named as a core veto/opposition leader in current Reuters summaries that emphasise France/Poland/Hungary and farmer protests elsewhere. (Reuters)

Axis 2 overall: Medium.

Final placement: Medium–Low readiness / Medium exposure.

DenmarkAxis 1 — Readiness to absorb competition

1) Production efficiency & structure: High.
Evidence: Denmark is described as having the highest average farm size in the EU (~75 ha) in the CAP strategic plan summary. (Agriculture and rural development)

2) Value-chain coordination: High.
Evidence: Denmark’s flagship agri-food value chains run through farmer-owned cooperatives and processors, and Arla describes itself as farmer-owned while Danish Crown states it is owned via a cooperative society structure. (Arla)

3) Execution capacity: Medium–High.
Evidence: Danish food-chain enforcement is described as operating under strict veterinary controls at farms and abattoirs, which signals strong compliance throughput in practice. (Danish Crown)

Axis 1 overall: High.

Axis 2 — Concentrated exposure in the sensitive basket

1) Sensitive-sector footprint: Low–Medium.
Evidence: Denmark’s core livestock model is heavily oriented to pork/dairy systems rather than the EU’s highest-salience Mercosur flashpoints highlighted in Reuters coverage (beef, sugar, poultry). (Reuters)

2) Buffer thinness where it lands: Low.
Evidence: Large average farm size is a buffer indicator. (Agriculture and rural development)

3) Mobilisation intensity: Low.
Evidence: Denmark is not reported as a leading veto-threat country, and it held the rotating presidency managing the process rather than opposing it. (Reuters)

Axis 2 overall: Low–Medium.

Final placement: High readiness / Low–Medium exposure.

GreeceAxis 1 — Readiness to absorb competition

1) Production efficiency & structure: Low.
Evidence: Greece’s official CAP profile gives an average farm size of ~5.8 ha, and reporting on Greek agriculture stresses high fragmentation, aging farmers, and low mechanisation/scale constraints. (farm-europe.eu)

2) Value-chain coordination: Low.
Evidence: The EEA review explicitly describes Greek primary production as fragmented and points to weak cooperative/value-chain organisation as a recurring constraint. (cooperativas-agro.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com)

3) Execution capacity: Low.
Evidence: Reuters reports a €392m correction tied to persistent deficiencies in subsidy checks, and EPPO communications describe investigations linked to the paying agency (OPEKEPE) around CAP-linked fraud dynamics. (Publications Office of the EU)

Axis 1 overall: Low.

Axis 2 — Concentrated exposure in the sensitive basket

1) Sensitive-sector footprint: Medium.
Evidence: The exposure mechanism is less “big national volumes” and more “thin-margin local systems,” and Greece’s farm structure is dominated by small holdings, which amplifies sensitivity to any price pressure in meat/similar baskets. (farm-europe.eu)

2) Buffer thinness where it lands: High.
Evidence: Very small average holding size and weak modernisation signals are direct thin-buffer indicators. (farm-europe.eu)

3) Mobilisation intensity: Medium.
Evidence: Greece appears in current coverage as part of the protest geography around the deal, even if it is not the headline veto leader. (The Guardian)

Axis 2 overall: Medium–High.

Final placement: Low readiness / Medium–High exposure.

BelgiumAxis 1 — Readiness to absorb competition

1) Production efficiency & structure: Medium.
Evidence: Flanders’ CAP profile shows an average farm size of ~27 ha and very intensive livestock systems, which implies capability in high-throughput farming, with regional asymmetry inside Belgium. (Agriculture and rural development)

2) Value-chain coordination: Medium.
Evidence: Belgium’s exposure is explicitly described as internally divided between trade/logistics strengths and farm vulnerability, and the distribution of livestock-intensive systems in Flanders is well documented in the CAP profile. (Agriculture and rural development)

3) Execution capacity: Medium.
Evidence: EU auditors treat CAP control performance as system-dependent at national level, and Belgium is not flagged in the same way as Greece/Romania in the sources used here. (European Court of Auditors)

Axis 1 overall: Medium.

Axis 2 — Concentrated exposure in the sensitive basket

1) Sensitive-sector footprint: High.
Evidence: Flanders alone reports ~4.5m pigs and ~6,000 poultry farms with ~5m poultry, and Belgium’s farm politics are strongly tied to livestock and price pressure narratives. (Agriculture and rural development)

2) Buffer thinness where it lands: Medium.
Evidence: The Belgian debate is framed as concentrated pain for farmers versus diffuse gains for exporters/logistics, which is a classic “thin-buffer, high-salience” pattern even in a richer member state. (The Guardian)

3) Mobilisation intensity: High.
Evidence: Reuters reports Belgian farmer protests against Mercosur turning violent, with police using tear gas and water cannon. (Reuters)

Axis 2 overall: High.

Final placement: Medium readiness / High exposure.

RomaniaAxis 1 — Readiness to absorb competition

1) Production efficiency & structure: Low.
Evidence: Romania is described as having ~3.5 million farmers, with structural weaknesses including limited irrigation and low education, and research summarises that the overwhelming majority of farms are under 5 ha. (Reuters)

2) Value-chain coordination: Low.
Evidence: The Romania CAP profile emphasises many small farmers and weak human-capital/irrigation constraints, which typically correlates with low bargaining power and weak processing integration outside a few large players. (Reuters)

3) Execution capacity: Low–Medium.
Evidence: OLAF public reporting covers rural development fund fraud cases in Romania, indicating governance and control vulnerabilities in CAP-linked spending environments. (European Commission)

Axis 1 overall: Low.

Axis 2 — Concentrated exposure in the sensitive basket

1) Sensitive-sector footprint: Medium.
Evidence: Reuters highlights the sensitive Mercosur flashpoints as beef/sugar/poultry, and Romania’s exposure is plausibly indirect through EU-wide price formation plus domestic rural dependence rather than being the headline national producer like France. (Reuters)

2) Buffer thinness where it lands: High.
Evidence: Romania is cited as having ~23% of its labour force in agriculture and very high elderly share, which makes adjustment shocks place-concentrated and politically fragile. (Reuters)

3) Mobilisation intensity: Medium.
Evidence: The mobilisation pattern is visible across Europe, and Romania’s structural dependence creates the conditions for escalation even when it is not the headline veto leader in Reuters narratives. (Reuters)

Axis 2 overall: Medium–High.

Final placement: Low readiness / Medium–High exposure.

BulgariaAxis 1 — Readiness to absorb competition

1) Production efficiency & structure: Low–Medium.
Evidence: Bulgaria’s CAP profile reports ~132,742 agricultural holdings and a rural population footprint, and specialist literature describes major structural transformation alongside persistent duality challenges. (Agriculture and rural development)

2) Value-chain coordination: Medium–Low.
Evidence: The same structure signals many holdings, which typically weakens bargaining power unless strongly coordinated, and the evidence base here does not show a Spain/Denmark-style cooperative backbone. (Agriculture and rural development)

3) Execution capacity: Medium.
Evidence: The Commission’s CAP governance logic treats modernisation success as dependent on administrative design and implementation, and EU auditors stress that fraud-control effectiveness varies with national systems. (Agriculture and rural development)

Axis 1 overall: Medium–Low.

Axis 2 — Concentrated exposure in the sensitive basket

1) Sensitive-sector footprint: Medium.
Evidence: The sensitive categories stressed in current EU political debate are beef/sugar/poultry, and Bulgaria’s core vulnerability is better evidenced through rural structure and buffers than through being named as the lead producer. (Reuters)

2) Buffer thinness where it lands: High.
Evidence: Rural areas account for a meaningful share of territory and population, and structural transformation literature stresses ongoing adjustment sensitivity. (Agriculture and rural development)

3) Mobilisation intensity: Medium.
Evidence: The deal’s mobilisation geography is explicitly pan-European in current reporting, and Bulgaria fits the “thin-buffer rural” profile that tends to politicise price shocks quickly. (Reuters)

Axis 2 overall: Medium–High.

Final placement: Medium–Low readiness / Medium–High exposure.

One-line axis outputs for the 2×2

• Germany: Axis 1 High, Axis 2 Low
• Denmark: Axis 1 High, Axis 2 Low–Medium
• Spain: Axis 1 Medium, Axis 2 Medium
• France: Axis 1 Medium–High, Axis 2 High
• Belgium: Axis 1 Medium, Axis 2 High
• Portugal: Axis 1 Medium–Low, Axis 2 Medium
• Greece: Axis 1 Low, Axis 2 Medium–High
• Romania: Axis 1 Low, Axis 2 Medium–High
• Bulgaria: Axis 1 Medium–Low, Axis 2 Medium–High

Numeric rules1) Rating → number (0 to 1 scale)

We used anchor points plus a few “leaning” midpoints:

• Low = 0.20
• Low–Medium (lean Low) = 0.30
• Medium–Low (lean Medium) = 0.40
• Medium = 0.55
• Medium–High (lean Medium) = 0.70
• Medium–High (lean High) = 0.75
• High = 0.85

2) Axis aggregation rule

For each axis, we set the final axis score as the median of the three factor numbers:

• Axis score = median(factor1, factor2, factor3)
  (so one extreme doesn’t dominate the placement)

Those two axis scores are the x,y coordinates used in the plotted 2×2.

Country,A1_Prod,A1_ValueChain,A1_Exec,A1_AxisScore,A2_Footprint,A2_BufferThinness,A2_Mobilization,A2_AxisScore,X,Y
Germany,0.85,0.85,0.75,0.85,0.20,0.30,0.20,0.20,0.85,0.20
Denmark,0.85,0.85,0.75,0.85,0.30,0.20,0.30,0.30,0.85,0.30
Spain,0.55,0.70,0.55,0.55,0.55,0.55,0.40,0.55,0.55,0.55
France,0.70,0.85,0.55,0.70,0.85,0.55,0.85,0.85,0.70,0.85
Belgium,0.55,0.55,0.70,0.55,0.85,0.55,0.85,0.85,0.55,0.85
Portugal,0.40,0.40,0.55,0.40,0.55,0.85,0.40,0.55,0.40,0.55
Greece,0.20,0.20,0.20,0.20,0.55,0.85,0.75,0.75,0.20,0.75
Romania,0.20,0.20,0.30,0.20,0.55,0.85,0.75,0.75,0.20,0.75
Bulgaria,0.40,0.40,0.55,0.40,0.55,0.85,0.75,0.75,0.40,0.75

The EU–Mercosur accord has ignited sharp debate among experts, stakeholders, and policymakers, often splitting into pro-growth vs. anti-displacement camps with underlying differences in values and trust:

• Growth vs. Displacement:
Proponents (including the European Commission, many economists, and export industry groups) argue the deal is a win-win bringing overall growth, more jobs, and consumer benefits.

They emphasize the modest positive-sum gain in GDP/welfare (European Parliament (DG EXPO) study, 2025; Sustainability Impact Assessment (LSE), 2020) and strategic advantages (like diversifying trade away from China) (OeNB Bulletin Q4/25, 2025; Thünen Institute update, 2025). Opponents (farm unions, environmental NGOs, some academics) counter that these macro gains are insignificant or illusory and come at the cost of painful sectoral displacement, arguing the headline +0.1% GDP does not reflect the social costs of job losses in rural areas or the difficulty of repurposing displaced farm labor (Austrian Chamber of Labour (AK Wien), 2021; Sustainability Impact Assessment (LSE), 2020).

For instance, Austrian analysts called the CGE gains “small and not validated,” warning of implausible trade patterns (large EU export surges vs. Mercosur) and possible overstatement of benefits (Austrian Chamber of Labour (AK Wien), 2021). This empirical debate boils down to whether one trusts the model predictions and believes the EU can smoothly compensate losers.

• Environmental & Standards Enforcement: There is broad disagreement over credibility in this area.

The Commission insists the deal “will not cause deforestation” and points to new sustainability provisions (TSD chapter, Paris Agreement language, and parallel EU instruments such as deforestation-related measures) as safeguards (European Parliament (DG EXPO) study, 2025; European Parliament Legislative Train – state of play). They also stress that imports must comply with EU SPS and food-safety rules (including bans on hormone-treated beef) (European Commission factsheet for farmers, Sep 2025; Thünen Institute update, 2025).

Critics argue the sustainability clauses amount to “empty promises,” and emphasize the absence (or weakness) of enforceable sanctions for environmental breaches (OeNB Bulletin Q4/25, 2025; European Parliament Legislative Train – state of play). They argue the pact could exacerbate deforestation by expanding beef and soy production.

A 2023 study prepared by Institut de l’Élevage for the Greens/EFA group estimated that, in worst-case scenarios, the beef quota could be associated with 620,000 to 1.35 million hectares of additional Amazon deforestation over five years (Greens/EFA – Institut de l’Élevage study, 2023). This value-based clash pits those prioritizing climate and biodiversity against those emphasizing engagement and enforcement through trade, arguing that closer EU alignment is preferable to Mercosur drifting toward alternative partners (OeNB Bulletin Q4/25, 2025; European Parliament (DG EXPO) study, 2025).

• Credibility & Trust: Doubts persist over whether Mercosur governments will honor commitments and whether the EU will deploy safeguards quickly enough.

Farmers and NGOs point to prior rollbacks and enforcement limits in the Amazon as reasons for skepticism about deforestation and labor-rights implementation (Greens/EFA – Institut de l’Élevage study, 2023). The EU’s “joint instrument” on deforestation has not fully reassured critics, who argue it lacks hard sanctions (European Parliament Legislative Train – state of play). Farmers also question whether the Commission would actually trigger bilateral safeguards if import surges “threaten” injury, or whether political delay would dominate until after damage is done (European Parliament (DG EXPO) study, 2025).

This credibility gap helps explain demands for firmer guarantees, including France’s push for an “emergency brake” and stricter pesticide-related assurances (TRT World/AFP – Macron statement, Jan 8 2026). On the other side, proponents argue that prior EU trade deals did not collapse EU agriculture, and note that quotas can be under-filled due to market conditions.

The Thünen Institute’s 2025 update, for example, finds no EU sector would shrink by more than 1.5% under Mercosur and highlights quota underutilization dynamics (Thünen Institute update, 2025). Detractors, meanwhile, point to “trade bias” and cumulative-agreement risk, citing earlier JRC-linked discussions warning of potentially serious hits to beef and poultry under multiple FTAs (Friends of Europe, 2018; European Parliament Legislative Train – state of play).

In summary, expert disagreement arises from differing empirical interpretations (model optimism vs. historical skepticism), value differences (economic liberalism vs. precautionary protection of farming and environment), and credibility judgments (trust in Mercosur and EU institutions to implement safeguards). The “growth vs. displacement” debate is not just about numbers but what Europe values more: a slight GDP uptick and geopolitical link, or safeguarding environmental commitments and the rural fabric.

The compromise emerging — with added safeguards, funds, and monitoring — seeks to narrow these divides, but the narrative gap remains large.